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@@ -20423,25 +20423,18 @@ inline void mbedtls_clear_cn_mismatch(uint32_t *flags) {
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*flags &= ~static_cast<uint32_t>(hostname_mismatch_code());
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}
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-inline int mbedtls_verify_callback(void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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- int cert_depth, uint32_t *flags);
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-
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// MbedTLS verify callback wrapper
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inline int mbedtls_verify_callback(void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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int cert_depth, uint32_t *flags) {
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// data points to the MbedTlsSession
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auto *session = static_cast<MbedTlsSession *>(data);
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- // set_sni() disabled hostname verification for this session: drop the
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- // CN/SAN mismatch flag so it doesn't fail the chain check below, mirroring
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- // the OpenSSL/wolfSSL backends where identity checking is independent of
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- // SNI. The final pass/fail decision still comes from the remaining flags
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- // (or, below, from the user's own verify callback).
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- if (session && session->suppress_hostname_mismatch) {
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- mbedtls_clear_cn_mismatch(flags);
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- }
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+ // set_sni() disabled hostname verification for this session: ignore the
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+ // CN/SAN mismatch flag, as the OpenSSL/wolfSSL backends do. The final
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+ // pass/fail decision still comes from the remaining flags (or, below, from
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+ // the user's own verify callback).
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+ if (session->suppress_hostname_mismatch) { mbedtls_clear_cn_mismatch(flags); }
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- if (!session || !session->ctx) { return 0; }
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const auto &callback = session->ctx->verify_callback;
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if (!callback) { return 0; } // Continue with default verification
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@@ -20858,9 +20851,9 @@ inline session_t create_session(ctx_t ctx, socket_t sock) {
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mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&session->ssl, &session->sock, impl::mbedtls_net_send_cb,
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impl::mbedtls_net_recv_cb, nullptr);
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- // Set the per-session verify callback. It looks up the context's user
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- // callback, if any, when the handshake runs, so it does not matter whether
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- // set_verify_callback() is called before or after this session is created.
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+ // Always install the verify callback: it reads the context's user callback
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+ // when the handshake runs, so the order of set_verify_callback() and this
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+ // call does not matter.
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session->ctx = mctx;
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mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(&session->ssl, impl::mbedtls_verify_callback, session);
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@@ -20888,7 +20881,6 @@ inline bool set_sni(session_t session, const char *hostname,
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msession->hostname = hostname;
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- // mbedtls_verify_callback() masks the mismatch flag for this session
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if (!verify_hostname) { msession->suppress_hostname_mismatch = true; }
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return true;
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